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INTRODUCTION 
The role of national courts in international commercial 
arbitration is more controversial than in domestic arbitration. When 
arbitration occurs in the fully domestic context, it displaces public 
court adjudication. For this reason, many national laws cabin off 
certain subject matter from arbitration altogether. And with respect to 
subject matter for which arbitration is permitted, national laws 
typically allow for oversight by courts to protect the rights of more 
disadvantaged parties. But in the international setting, any national 
government’s interests are diminished because providing credible 
dispute resolution is believed to increase the net inflow of foreign 
business. Moreover, the domestic parties are usually local companies 
doing international business or State entities, not disenfranchised 
individuals (e.g., women, minorities, workers, the poor). 
Indeed, there is a Platonic ideal of international arbitration as a 
fully autonomous transnational system of dispute resolution.1 On this 
                                                       
1. See, e.g., Julian D.M. Lew, Achieving the Dream: Autonomous Arbitration, 22 ARB. 
INT’L 179, 181 (2006) (“Today, there is increasingly, I suggest, a new regime. International 
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view, two or more parties from different countries doing business 
together agree to resolve disputes privately without any assistance 
from national courts potentially hostile to the interests of foreign 
litigants. The parties’ agreement to arbitrate reflects an explicit, 
mutual rejection of national courts or other national public fora for 
dispute resolution. The ideal is realized in the many cases in which 
the parties do not contest that they agreed to arbitrate, proceed to 
arbitrate the dispute, and then accept the award that results. 
The reality, however, is that international arbitration always 
operates in the shadow of national courts, which often intervene 
directly. It is accordingly more accurate to say that international 
arbitrations and national courts are engaged in an ongoing partnership 
that has evolved over time. Indeed, most of the laws, rules, and 
commentary on international arbitration address the instances in 
which parties who contracted for international arbitration may choose 
or be forced to litigate in national courts. Thus, for instance, the 1958 
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention” or 
“Convention”), the touchstone treaty on international commercial 
arbitration, speaks specifically to the obligations of the signatory 
States to honor agreements to arbitrate and to recognize and enforce 
arbitral awards.2 
As the provisions of the Convention suggest, the state—
principally through national courts—may have to intervene at two 
junctures: (1) before an arbitral proceeding, if a party asserts that it 
did not agree to arbitrate at all or (2) after the proceeding, if a party 
refuses to comply with an arbitral award. If one focuses on these 
explicit instances, the relationship between national courts and 
international arbitral tribunals seems to resemble a relay race where 
the baton is passed from judge to arbitrator and then back to judge. 
But, as the British international lawyer Lord Mustill, who coined the 
                                                       
arbitration is a sui juris or autonomous dispute resolution process, governed primarily by non-
national rules and accepted international commercial rules and practices. . . . As such, the 
relevance and influence of national arbitration laws and of national court supervision and 
revision is greatly reduced.”). 
2. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. The 
New York Convention has achieved nearly worldwide acceptance with 156 states to date 
having become parties to the Convention. See United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Status: Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/
arbitration/NYConvention_status.html. 
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relay-race analogy, observed, there are many more ways that national 
courts might be involved in international arbitrations: 
In real life the position is not so clear-cut. Very few 
commentators would now assert that the legitimate functions of 
the court entirely cease when the arbitrators receive the file, and 
conversely very few would doubt that there is a point at which 
the court takes on a purely subordinate role. But when does this 
happen? And what is the position at the further end of the 
process? Does the court retake the baton only if and when invited 
to enforce the award, or does it have functions to be exercised at 
an earlier stage, if something has gone wrong with the arbitration, 
by setting-aside the award or intervening in some other way?3 
Despite the attention paid to the role of national courts in 
international arbitrations,4 there is no large-n empirical research and 
surprisingly little systemic analysis regarding what this Article will 
refer to as border crossings:5 the various paths by which parties that 
                                                       
3. D. Alan Redfern, Arbitration and the Courts: Interim Measures of Protection—Is the 
Tide About to Turn?, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 71, 75 (1995) (quoting Lord Mustill, Comments and 
Conclusions, in CONSERVATORY AND PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 118, 119 (ICC Int’l Court of Arbitration ed., 1993)). Lord Mustill famously 
compared the relationship between courts and arbitrators to a relay race in an address at an 
international arbitration conference: 
Ideally, the handling of arbitrable disputes should resemble a relay-race. In the 
initial stages, before the arbitrators are seized of the dispute, the baton is in the grasp 
of the court; for at that stage there is no other organization which could take steps to 
prevent the arbitration agreement from being ineffectual. When the arbitrators take 
charge they take over the baton and retain it until they have made an award. At this 
point, having no longer a function to fulfill, the arbitrators hand back the baton so 
that the court can in case of need lend its coercive powers to the enforcement of the 
award. 
See id. at 74-75. 
4. See, e.g., S.I. Strong, Navigating the Borders Between International Commercial 
Arbitration and U.S. Federal Courts: A Jurisprudential GPS, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 121-
22 (2012) (providing “a brief introduction to the relationship between international arbitral 
proceedings and U.S. federal courts”). See generally ICCA CONGRESS SERIES NO. 10, 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND NATIONAL COURTS: THE NEVER ENDING STORY (Albert 
Jan van den Berg ed., 2001); Charles C. Correll, Jr. & Ryan J. Szczepanik, No Arbitration is 
an Island: The Role of Courts in Aid of International Arbitration, 6 WORLD ARB. & 
MEDIATION REV. 565 (2012). 
5. This Article uses the phrase border crossings purely in a descriptive sense, without 
any intent to imply that any particular interaction between an international arbitration and a 
national court is good or bad, cooperative or confrontational. This usage contrasts, for 
instance, with Gary Born’s reference to border crossings, which he characterizes as sanctioned 
interventions by national courts, and “border incursions,” which he condemns as 
counterproductive. See S.I. Strong, Border Skirmishes: The Intersection Between Litigation 
and International Commercial Arbitration, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 1, 9, 11 (2012) (citing 
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have plausibly opted for international arbitration may nonetheless end 
up in national courts. Specifically, there is very little scholarship 
tracking or analyzing data about the incidence of border crossings in 
actual national court systems;6 indeed, this is the first US empirical 
survey. Furthermore, much of the sizable anecdotal scholarship on the 
subject of border crossings is fragmentary. Authors typically choose 
to focus on one or a few categories of border crossings, most 
prominently those related to the judicial enforcement of arbitration 
agreements and the judicial role in setting aside or enforcing arbitral 
awards.7 There is also growing interest in the trend of national courts 
ordering pre-award interim, or post-award supplemental, relief in aid 
of arbitral tribunals, especially as against State parties in the investor-
state context.8 The few accounts that pull all of this together typically 
list the different categories of judicial intervention, describe them, and 
give a few illustrative examples. To date, no one has attempted an 
empirical study of the different types of border crossings together and 
systematically. 
Another common theme in the existing commentary by both 
academics and practitioners is perceived competition between 
                                                       
Gary Born, Partner, Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale and Dorr, LLP, Keynote Address, Center 
for the Study of Dispute Resolution Annual Symposium 2011, Boarder Skirmishes: The 
Intersection between International Commercial Arbitration and Litigation (Oct. 21, 2011) 
[hereinafter Gary Born Keynote]) (introducing points made by Gary Born in his keynote 
address at a symposium event in October 2011). Another similar but distinguishable concept is 
José Alvarez’s idea of boundary crossings, by which he means the potentially problematic 
migration of interpretive techniques across different subject matters in international law. See 
generally José E. Alvarez, Beware: Boundary Crossings, in BOUNDARIES OF RIGHTS, 
BOUNDARIES OF STATE (Tsvi Kahana & Anat Scolnicov, eds.) (forthcoming Apr. 2016) 
(N.Y.U. Law Sch. Pub. Law Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-51, 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2498182. 
6. There are some rare exceptions. See, e.g., Johan Munck & Helga Hullmann, Mål om 
Klander av Skiljedom i Hovrätterna [Challenge of Arbitral Awards before Courts of Appeal] 2 
SvJT 141 (2015), http://www.sccinstitute.com/media/69180/2015hftxsxxxmunckhullmann-
eng.pdf (providing a review of challenges of arbitral awards opened in the period between 
January 1, 2004 and May 31, 2014 before Swedish Courts of Appeal). 
7. See generally George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in International 
Commercial Arbitration, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2012); Emmanuel Gaillard, The Enforcement 
of Awards Set Aside in the Country of Origin, 14 ICSID REV. 16 (1999); Hans Smit, 
Annulment and Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards: A Practical Perspective, 18 
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 297 (2007). 
8. A prime example is discovery of assets for enforcement of awards, especially in the 
investor-state context against state parties. See, e.g., Brian King et al., Enforcing Awards 
Involving Foreign Sovereigns, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK 
413, 424-37 (James H. Carter & John Fellas eds., 2010) (discussing attachment and execution 
in cases involving foreign sovereigns). 
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national courts and international arbitral tribunals. The two are often 
portrayed as fighting for jurisdiction. National courts are depicted as 
defending their jurisdictions to decide disputes with a center of 
gravity within their sovereign borders against overreaching or 
encroachment by international arbitral tribunals.9 And the rules and 
commentary of the international arbitration community emphasize 
strategies to avoid resort to national courts as much as possible, 
presumably to prevent a party from backsliding on its commitment to 
resolve a controversy by private means. 
A concrete example of this tendency to minimize national court 
involvement is the consensus in the international arbitration literature 
that a State’s courts cannot set aside arbitral awards solely because 
the parties contractually chose that State’s law to govern the 
substance of any dispute.10 There is a plain-language suggestion to the 
contrary in the New York Convention, which states that a signatory 
State may refuse recognition and enforcement of an award “set aside 
or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or 
under the law of which, that award was made.”11 As a matter of plain 
language, if an arbitral panel decides a contractual dispute under New 
York law pursuant to a choice of law provision that the parties agreed 
to, that arbitral award was made “under the law” of New York. It is 
accordingly at least plausible that a New York court would have set 
aside jurisdiction even if the arbitral seat was Paris, France and the 
parties were non-US. But international arbitration experts almost 
universally construe this textual ambiguity in the Convention as 
foreclosing such an interpretation, despite a lack of evidence in the 
legislative history dispositively rebutting the plain-language reading.12 
                                                       
9. See, e.g., Alan Scott Rau, Crossing the Threshold: Arbitral Jurisdiction after BG 
Group, in MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR DU PROFESSEUR PIERRE MAYER (L.G.D.J. ed.) 
(forthcoming 2015) (Energy Center Research Paper No. 2014-04, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2492627. 
10. See, e.g., 3 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2996-
3001 (2d ed. 2014) [hereinafter 3 BORN]; NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER 
ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 591-92 (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter REDFERN & HUNTER]. 
11. New York Convention, supra note 2, art. V(1)(e) (emphasis added). 
12. The New York Convention says “set aside or suspended by a competent authority of 
the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.” Born, for instance, 
argues that the reference to “under the law of which” pertained to the “largely theoretical case” 
where the parties provided in the arbitration agreement for a procedural law governing the 
arbitration different from the law of the place of arbitration. See 3 BORN, supra note 10, at 
2990. He says that “The Convention’s drafting history supports this conclusion” with a 
footnote to a different part of his treatise. Id. However, the cross-referenced part, 
§11.03[C][1][c], supplies no evidence from the drafting history on this point. In the absence of 
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This Article aims to provide the first comprehensive empirical 
mapping of the various kinds of border crossings and, in so doing, to 
generate a richer understanding of how to regulate and navigate the 
crossings. This mapping will be done by means of a survey of data on 
New York Convention-related litigation in the US federal trial court 
for the Southern District of New York, which includes Manhattan. 
The federal district court in the SDNY is the busiest venue for border 
crossings in the world—the John F. Kennedy (JFK) Airport of the 
international commercial arbitration community. A snapshot of border 
crossing statistics at the JFK of international arbitration cases can help 
scholars and practitioners to design and implement more efficient and 
productive partnerships between national courts and international 
commercial arbitration. And, at a deeper level, knowledge of the 
empirical facts on the ground helps us to comprehend what that 
project of international arbitration actually is—not a Platonic dream 
of an autarkic system of private dispute resolution across borders, but 
rather a hybrid private-public model that takes a middle path to avoid 
the perceived parochialism of full resort to national courts. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I identifies, describes, 
and organizes eleven different border crossings—scenarios in which 
parties that have plausibly chosen international arbitration may find 
themselves in national courts. Part II collects and describes survey 
data from the docket of the Federal District Court for the Southern 
District of New York from December 29, 1970 (the date when the 
New York Convention entered into force for the United States) to 
September 15, 2014, in order to track frequencies per border crossings 
and trends over time. Part III—the analytical and normative part—
takes the description and observations generated by the prior parts to 
suggest how the role of national courts in international arbitrations 
can be reconceived. This is a first cut at the data—we envision future 
studies to examine in greater depth the qualitative information in the 
collected data on winners, losers, types of claims, and amounts of 
damages. A brief conclusion follows. 
                                                       
any such legislative history, it seems more reasonable to construe the language of the 
Convention according to its plain meaning rather than as referring to an implausible 
“theoretical” possibility, which Born himself called “a highly unusual, ‘once-in-a-blue-moon’ 
occurrence.” Id. at 2995 (quoting Karaha Bodas Co., LLC v. Perusahaan Pertambangan 
Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 564 F.3d 274, 291 (5th Cir. 2004)). 
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I. THE BORDER CROSSINGS 
The words border crossings as used in this Article refer to the 
various paths by which parties that have plausibly opted for 
international arbitration may nonetheless end up in national courts. 
Such crossings may be bidirectional: parties may move from an 
international arbitral proceeding to a national court proceeding and 
then back to international arbitration. For example, parties may find 
themselves in a court requesting discovery from non-parties in the 
United States and then go back to an arbitral tribunal to present the 
evidence collected with the court’s assistance. 
International arbitration, in turn, means consensual resolution of 
disputes between parties of differing nationalities by a private 
decisionmaker or decisionmakers whose adjudication the disputants 
have agreed to accept as binding. As the parties in international 
commercial arbitration generally come from different countries, they 
do not share a national court. Should a dispute arise in the absence of 
an arbitration agreement, both sides expect that national courts will 
favor their own nationals. And so, the parties typically agree to 
private international arbitration as a substitute to national courts. By 
contrast, in domestic arbitration, the parties share nationality, and so 
they are not as dubious about bias in the national court. 
Consequently, in the international context the parties have a 
greater preference for arbitration autonomy to keep resort to national 
courts to the minimum required by the New York Convention. A key 
driver behind the growing popularity of international arbitrations is 
the Convention, itself a multilateral treaty ratified by 156 countries 
requiring members to enforce foreign or non-domestic arbitration 
agreements and awards subject to limited exceptions. There is no 
comparable multilateral treaty for the enforcement of foreign court 
judgments. 
Private dispute resolution by international arbitration thus stands 
at the crossroads of international and national legal orders. The 
process occurs under the long shadow of an international law 
instrument—the New York Convention. But the rules of decision 
applied to any dispute that is arbitrated are usually drawn from 
national legal orders, whether of one of the parties or of a benchmark 
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jurisdiction, like New York for business contract law.13 Furthermore, 
although in many instances parties will rely exclusively on the private 
dispute resolution process, often under the auspices of an institution 
like the International Chamber of Commerce (the “ICC”), there will 
be times when a party brings some aspect of the dispute to a national 
court. 
As noted earlier, almost all international arbitration experts 
acknowledge the essential part that national courts play in the arbitral 
process.14 As Lord Mustill observed: 
[T]he arbitral process cannot remain effective without a 
partnership between that process and the courts. The old and 
sterile confrontation between the “minimalists” and the 
“maximalists” regarding the part to be played by the domestic 
courts has now given way to a recognition that the courts must 
recognise the essential role of arbitration in international 
commerce, and give it the maximum permissible support; and a 
converse recognition that arbitration cannot flourish without that 
support.15 
Gary Born also underlined the important role of national courts 
in the international commercial arbitration process,16 pointing to three 
specific junctures: (1) enforcement of international arbitration 
agreements, (2) enforcement of international arbitral awards, and (3) 
support of arbitral proceedings—for instance, by appointing 
arbitrators, assisting in the resolution of jurisdictional disputes, 
affording provisional measures, and facilitating evidence taking.17 
                                                       
13. We hear of invocations of lex mercatoria, lex petrolea, and so forth, but they are a 
minority. By the same token, the parties can opt for ex aequo et bono arbitration by explicit 
choice, but this is rare outside of specialized industries and smaller-stakes cases. 
14. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
DISPUTES: STUDIES IN LAW AND PRACTICE 181 (2d ed. 2012) (“[S]ome measure of judicial 
scrutiny over arbitral jurisdiction remains a vital safeguard to the integrity of the process, and 
constitutes an essential corollary to enforcement of legitimate awards.”); REDFERN & HUNTER, 
supra note 10, at 441 (“[T]he involvement of national courts in the international arbitration 
process remains essential to its effectiveness.”); W. Michael Reisman & Heide Iravani, The 
Changing Relation of National Courts and International Commercial Arbitration, 21 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARB. 5, 16 (2010) (“But arbitration is not an autonomous system . . . its 
functioning is inextricably linked to national courts.”). 
15. Lord Mustill, supra note 3, at 118. 
16. See Strong, supra note 5, at 9 (referring to Gary Born who, in his keynote address, 
outlined instances of necessary and desirable involvement of courts in international 
commercial arbitration). 
17. See id. at 9-10. 
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The normative argument for court interventions in the 
international arbitral process seems especially strong in cases at two 
opposite ends of a spectrum. At one end are due process-level 
violations of procedural fairness. An international arbitration may be 
so poisoned by unfairness against one side that any resultant award 
should be set aside by a court at the seat of arbitration. On the other 
end of the spectrum is a lawsuit to recognize or enforce an arbitral 
award against an award debtor who was afforded notice and full and 
fair opportunity to make its case before a competent arbitral tribunal. 
In such a case, a court order reinforces the integrity of the 
international arbitral process by coercing the award debtor to pay. 
International arbitration scholars and practitioners tend to 
criticize and warn against national court interference in the arbitral 
process in a range of other circumstances in between the two ends of 
the spectrum.18 The most notable of these are undue interference of 
courts into the arbitrators’ competence to decide their own 
jurisdiction or attempts by national courts to set aside awards 
generated by arbitral proceedings rendered in foreign countries and 
under the procedural law of foreign countries.19 
No list of the border crossings can be fully comprehensive, but 
the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration (the “UNCITRAL Model Law” 
or “Model Law”)20 provide two useful starting points. The New York 
Convention explicitly mentions two state intervention points—actions 
to enforce arbitration agreements and actions to enforce or recognize 
arbitral awards. The Convention also makes indirect reference to a 
third type of border crossings—an action to set aside an award. The 
text of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which is commonly perceived as 
                                                       
18. See, e.g., 2 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2189 (2d 
ed. 2014) [hereinafter 2 BORN] (“[L]eading international arbitration conventions, arbitration 
legislation and institutional rules all adopt a basic principle of judicial non-interference in the 
ongoing conduct of the arbitral proceedings. This principle is fundamentally important to the 
efficacy of the international arbitral process. . . .”). 
19. See, e.g., 3 BORN, supra note 10, at 2995-3001 (criticizing as “misconceived and 
violat[ing] both the language and purposes of the Convention” the decisions of Indian, 
Pakistani, and Indonesian courts, which have construed Article V(1)(e) of the New York 
Convention as referring to the substantive law applicable to the merits of the dispute rather 
than the procedural law of arbitration). 
20. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, G.A. Res. 40/72, 
U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 17, Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (Dec. 11, 1985), amended 
by G.A. Res. 61/33, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/61/17 (Dec. 4, 2006) 
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law]. 
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seeking to constrain court involvement in international arbitration,21 
explicitly contemplates a role for the “competent court” in the arbitral 
process in at least 13 out of the 47 articles of the Model Law.22 These 
articles can be grouped into 10 discrete types of border crossings—the 
3 referenced in the New York Convention, and 7 others: 
(1) enforcement of the arbitration agreement (Article 8); 
(2) court issuance of interim measures (Articles 9 and 17 J); 
(3) appointment of arbitrators and related measures 
(Articles 11(3) and 11(4));23 
(4) adjudication of a challenge of an arbitrator following an 
unsuccessful challenge under the arbitration agreement or before 
the arbitral tribunal (Article 13(3)); 
(5) adjudication of the termination of the arbitrator’s mandate in 
cases of failure or impossibility to act by an arbitrator 
(Article 14); 
(6) adjudication of a preliminary ruling by an arbitral tribunal 
upholding its own jurisdiction (Article 16(3)); 
(7) recognition and enforcement of interim measures issued by 
an arbitral tribunal (Articles 17 H and 17 I); 
(8) court assistance to arbitral tribunals in taking evidence 
(Article 27); 
(9) setting aside of arbitral awards (Article 34); and 
(10) recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards (Articles 35 
and 36).24 
                                                       
21. See, e.g., REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 10, at 441 (“The Model Law seeks to 
exclude the involvement of the courts as far as possible.”); see also UNCITRAL Model Law, 
supra note 20, art. 5. 
22. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 20, arts. 8-9, 11, 13-14, 16, 17 H-17 J, 27, 
34-36. 
23. Note that under Article 15 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, the same appointment 
procedure, involving potential reliance on the court, is used when the appointment of substitute 
arbitrators is needed. See id. art. 15. 
24. See id. arts. 8-9, 11, 13-14, 16, 17 H-17 J, 27, 34-36; see also id. art. 6, which allows 
each State adopting the law to specify the court or other authority for certain functions of 
arbitration assistance and supervision as provided for in articles 11(3) (dealing with failure to 
agree on procedure for appointment of arbitrators), 11(4) (failure to act under an agreed 
appointment procedure), 13(3) (court deciding on challenge of arbitrators following an 
unsuccessful challenge with the arbitral tribunal), 14 (deciding on the termination of the 
arbitrator’s mandate following his/her failure or impossibility to act), 16(3) (deciding whether 
arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction) and 34(2) (recourse to a court against an arbitral award by an 
application for setting aside). 
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Another type of border crossing that is not mentioned in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law but which has a high current profile is 
litigation in national courts to obtain evidence or otherwise to aid 
attachment of the assets of an award debtor within the relevant 
jurisdiction. In summary, then, there appears to be a total of 11 
categories of border crossings (See Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Circumstances in Which a National Court Might Be 
Asked to Intervene in an International Arbitration 
 
 Border Crossing 
(*: indicates a 
principal crossing, 
i.e., recognized by 
the New York 
Convention) 
Timing 
with respect 
to arbitral 
proceeding 
Relevant Provisions 
of the New York 
Convention or 
UNCITRAL Model 
Law  
Likely National 
Courts 
(+: indicates a 
clear primary 
jurisdiction) 
1. Enforcement of the 
arbitration 
agreement* 
Before or 
during 
New York 
Convention Art. II; 
UNCITRAL Model 
Law Art. 8 
Seat of 
arbitration+; 
national court of 
a party 
2. Court issuance of 
interim measures 
Before or 
during 
UNCITRAL Model 
Law Arts. 9 and 17 J 
Seat of 
arbitration, place 
of enforcement, 
or location of the 
property or 
evidence 
3. Appointment of 
arbitrators 
Before UNCITRAL Model 
Law Arts. 11(3) and 
11(4) 
Seat of 
arbitration+ 
4. Challenges to 
arbitrators 
Before or 
during 
UNCITRAL Model 
Law Art. 13(3) 
Seat of 
arbitration+ or a 
party’s home 
state 
5. Termination of 
arbitrators’ mandate 
in cases of failure or 
impossibility to act 
During UNCITRAL Model 
Law Art. 14 
Seat of 
arbitration+ 
6. Challenges to arbitral 
jurisdiction (in cases 
where arbitral 
tribunal rules as 
preliminary matter 
that it has 
jurisdiction) 
During UNCITRAL Model 
Law Art. 16(3) 
Seat of 
arbitration+ 
7. Court enforcement of 
tribunal-issued 
interim measures 
During UNCITRAL Model 
Law Arts. 17 H and 
17 I 
Seat of 
arbitration+ 
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Table 1-continued from previous page 
 Border Crossing 
(*: indicates a 
principal crossing, 
i.e., recognized by 
the New York 
Convention) 
Timing 
with respect 
to arbitral 
proceeding 
Relevant Provisions 
of the New York 
Convention or 
UNCITRAL Model 
Law  
Likely National 
Courts 
(+: indicates a 
clear primary 
jurisdiction) 
8. Court assistance in 
taking evidence 
During UNCITRAL Model 
Law Art. 27 
Anywhere that 
allows it, cf. 28 
U.S.C. §1782 in 
the United States 
9. Setting aside of 
arbitral awards* 
After New York 
Convention 
Art. V(1)(e); 
UNCITRAL Model 
Law Art. 34 
Seat of 
arbitration has 
primary 
jurisdiction, but 
secondary 
jurisdiction 
“under the law 
of which, that 
award was 
made” 
10. Recognition and 
enforcement of 
arbitral awards* 
After New York 
Convention Arts. III 
and V; UNCITRAL 
Model Law Arts. 35 
and 36 
Where the 
award-creditor 
seeks it, usually 
losing party’s 
jurisdiction or 
the United States 
as a default 
jurisdiction 
11. Execution of 
enforced arbitral 
award 
After  Where the 
award-debtor has 
assets 
 
Before describing the specific border crossings in greater detail, 
let us consider three different ways to categorize them. One way is to 
divide them temporally: a national court might be asked to intervene 
before an arbitral proceeding has started, during the proceeding, or 
after an award is rendered.25 A second way would be to categorize 
them according to the perceived importance of the question posed to a 
national court. The three crossings mentioned in the New York 
Convention together might be characterized as principal border 
crossings, and all others as supplemental crossings. A third way to 
organize interventions by national courts would be geographically. A 
                                                       
25. See, e.g., John J. Barceló III, Who Decides the Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction? Separability 
and Competence-Competence in Transnational Perspective, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
1115, 1118 (2003) (dividing the court-arbitration process into three stages). 
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court in the State in which an arbitral proceeding takes place might be 
seen as having primary jurisdiction over border crossings26 and courts 
in other States as seized of secondary jurisdiction, most significantly 
for suits in which a winning party seeks to enforce or recognize an 
arbitral award. This Article will categorize the border crossings in a 
hybrid fashion relying mostly on the chronological and significance 
metrics. 
A. Enforcement of the arbitration agreement 
International arbitration starts with an agreement between the 
parties to send disputes between or among them to arbitration. The 
New York Convention requires such agreements to be in writing to 
avail of its protections. The treaty binds the courts of signatory States 
to enforce an agreement to arbitrate unless it is “null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed.”27 
Challenges to an arbitration agreement generally take one of two 
forms. First, after attempting unsuccessfully to get the other side to 
arbitrate a dispute, a party may sue in a national court in order to 
compel arbitration. Such suits are typically brought in the national 
courts of the country in which the arbitration was supposed to take 
place, or of a country that has a plausible basis of adjudicative 
jurisdiction (called personal or territorial jurisdiction in the United 
States) over the defendant who had refused to arbitrate. Second, a 
party may ignore the arbitration agreement and bring a lawsuit in a 
national court, acting as if the agreement never existed. The defendant 
then might plead the arbitration agreement as an affirmative defense 
or as the basis for a motion to dismiss the suit. In US courts, such a 
defendant would also typically file a counter-motion to compel 
arbitration. This second type of suit is usually brought in a jurisdiction 
that the plaintiff perceives to be friendly, paradigmatically its home 
jurisdiction if there is a basis for adjudicative jurisdiction over the 
defendant there. 
                                                       
26. For the concepts of “primary” and “secondary” jurisdictions and the corresponding 
powers of courts in these jurisdictions with respect to arbitral awards, see, e.g., Karaha Bodas 
Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d 357 (5th 
Cir. 2003). See generally Alan Scott Rau, Understanding (and Misunderstanding) “Primary 
Jurisdiction,” 21 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 47 (2010). 
27. New York Convention, supra note 2, art. II(3); UNCITRAL Model Law, supra 
note 20, art. 8(1). 
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The doctrine of separability in international arbitration famously 
prescribes that a challenge to the validity of an arbitration agreement 
is legally distinct from a challenge to the validity of the underlying 
business contract of which it is a part—the so-called container 
contract. A corollary of separability doctrine is that a challenge to the 
validity of the container contract does not necessarily entail a 
challenge to the agreement to arbitrate, and so may be sent to the 
arbitrators for their adjudication. The exception is when the attack on 
the container contract contests whether it ever came into existence at 
all, for example, because the individual who signed on behalf of the 
contracting counter-party was an imposter. 
From a policy perspective, separability doctrine is justifiable as a 
safeguard against a moral hazard posed by dispute settlement by 
private arbitrators. Decisions about the validity of arbitration 
agreements necessarily implicate the power of arbitrators to decide 
the scope of their jurisdiction—the principle of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz. But arbitrators have a powerful economic interest to 
uphold their jurisdiction, since, unlike judges who are public officials 
paid by a State, their compensation depends to a large extent on their 
upholding jurisdiction so they can hear the case. National court 
oversight thus seems critical as a check against the danger that 
arbitrators will uphold their jurisdiction even when the arbitration 
agreement is null or void. 
But national laws have different approaches as to how they 
regulate judicial interventions to enforce arbitration agreements at the 
onset of proceedings. This is in part due to the fact that the invalidity 
of an arbitration agreement is one of the grounds available under the 
New York Convention for challenging an arbitral award after it has 
been rendered. And so there is a second opportunity to address the 
possibility of arbitrators overreaching, but it comes only after 
considerable time and resources have been spent by participating in 
arbitral proceedings. 
Differences across national jurisdictions also reflect varying 
assessments of the severity of the moral hazard facing the arbitrators. 
French law, for example, instructs judges to dismiss onset challenges 
if an arbitral tribunal has already been set up (meaning that the 
challenging party at least participated in the arbitration to that 
point).28 And, if an arbitral tribunal has not been set up, French law 
                                                       
28. See NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [N.C.P.C.] art. 1448 (Fr.). 
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requires a national court to dismiss the case unless it determines that 
the arbitration agreement is manifestly void or manifestly not 
applicable, not simply so.29 United States courts, by contrast, will 
retain jurisdiction to hear a challenge to an arbitration agreement even 
if a tribunal has been set up so long as it is the agreement being 
challenged, or the party resisting arbitration claims that the container 
contract never came into existence. 
In the United States, both federal and state courts may get 
involved in the enforcement of international arbitration agreements. 
Under Section 203 of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”), US 
district courts have original jurisdiction over an action or proceeding 
falling under the New York Convention.30 Section 206 of the FAA 
expressly authorizes such courts to compel arbitration in accordance 
with the arbitration agreement.31 An action or proceeding to enforce 
an arbitration agreement may also be started in state courts. However, 
the defendant will often seek to remove such action or proceeding to 
US federal court under Section 205 of the FAA, availing itself of the 
benefits of litigation in the federal court system.32 The court 
proceedings on the merits could be accompanied at this stage with a 
request for interim relief.33 
B. Court issuance of interim measures 
Increasingly, parties to international arbitration agreements seek 
interim measures34 before proceedings have begun in order to 
                                                       
29. See id. 
30. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 203 (2015). 
31. Id. § 206. 
32. Id. § 205. 
33. For analysis of the relevant U.S. case law with respect to interim relief provided by 
courts in this context, see generally Martin Davies, Court-Ordered Interim Measures in Aid of 
International Commercial Arbitration, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 299 (2006). 
34. For the purposes of this Article, we use the term “interim measures” or “interim 
relief,” which encompasses other terms used in arbitration laws and rules with respect to 
interim measures, such as “provisional measures,” “preliminary measures,” “conservatory 
measures,” “precautionary measures,” and combination of these terms. See, e.g., REDFERN & 
HUNTER, supra note 10, at 444-45 (referring to the terms used in the English and French 
versions of the ICC Rules of Arbitration and the Swiss law on international arbitration); see 
also FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 709 
(Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999) (commenting on the “not always helpful” 
terminology used in the context of provisional and conservatory measures). For a definition of 
interim measures as applicable to international commercial arbitration, see UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17, ch. V, sec. 7, U.N. 
Doc. A/31/17 (Dec. 15, 1976), as revised by G.A. Res. 65/22, U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., Supp. 
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preserve the status quo. The US litigation equivalents are preliminary 
injunctions, temporary restraining orders, and pre-trial attachments of 
assets. The need to go to court for interim measures had once been 
considered the Achilles’ heel of international arbitration, since arbitral 
tribunals used to be incapable of ordering and enforcing interim 
measures.35 
Today, however, many leading international arbitral institutions 
have rules affording tribunals jurisdiction to order interim measures.36 
Still, a national court remains the default, or even the only forum 
choice, where: (1) an urgent interim measure is needed prior to the 
constitution of an arbitral tribunal; (2) a party resists compliance with 
tribunal-ordered interim measures; or (3) the interim measure sought 
is directed towards a third party, which is not bound by the arbitration 
agreement and thus beyond the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction.37 
Generally speaking, requests to courts for interim measures are not 
held to constitute an infringement or waiver of an agreement to 
arbitrate, or otherwise to affect the powers of arbitral tribunal.38 
The New York Convention does not contain any provisions on 
interim measures. The 1975 Inter-American Convention on 
International Commercial Arbitration (the “Panama Convention”) 
also has no provisions for interim measures.39 Conversely, the 1961 
European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration does 
provide for court involvement in the provision of interim relief for 
                                                       
No. 17, Ch. III & Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/65/17 (Dec. 6, 2010), with new art. 1, ¶ 4, as adopted 
by G.A. Res. 68/109, U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., Supp. No. 17, Ch. III & Annex II, U.N. Doc. 
A/68/17 (Dec. 16, 2013) art. 26(2) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules]. 
35. See Davies, supra note 33, at 333. 
36. See, e.g., International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules of Arbitration, art. 28 
(Jan. 1, 2012), http://www.iccwbo.org/Data/Documents/Buisness-Services/Dispute-Resolution
-Services/Mediation/Rules/2012-Arbitration-Rules-and-2014-Mediation-Rules-ENGLISH-
version/ [hereinafter ICC Rules of Arbitration]. 
37. See, e.g., Redfern, supra note 3, at 86. 
38. See, e.g., European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration art. VI(4), 
Apr. 21, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 349; see also Arbitration Act 2010 (Act No. 1/2010) art. 9 (Ir.), 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2010/act/1/enacted/en/pdf; Chūsai-hō [Arbitration Act], Law 
No. 138 of 2003, amended by Law No. 147 of 2004, art. 15 (Japan); International Arbitration 
Rules, in INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION PROCEDURES (INCLUDING MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION RULES) (2014) 
art. 24(3) [hereinafter AAA/ICDR Arbitration Rules]; ICC Rules of Arbitration, supra note 36, 
art. 28(2); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 34, art. 26(9). 
39. Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, 
104 Stat. 448, 14 I.L.M. 336 (as implemented by Chapter 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 
9 U.S.C. §§ 301–307) [hereinafter Panama Convention]. 
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international arbitrations.40 The UNCITRAL Model Law, which in 
2006 introduced a separate Chapter IV A (Interim Measures and 
Preliminary Orders41) dedicated primarily to tribunal-ordered interim 
relief, contains only one article on court-ordered interim measures.42 
The issue of court-ordered interim measures is thus left largely 
to national lawmakers and is dealt with differently in various 
domestic laws. Arbitration laws of many jurisdictions, including 
Austria, England, France, India, South Korea, Russia, and Sweden, 
provide for court-ordered interim measures in support of arbitration.43 
Some other States, including Italy, Greece, Brazil, and Thailand, still 
do not allow interim measures to be ordered by arbitral tribunals, thus 
making the court the only forum choice for a party seeking interim 
relief.44 The rules of arbitral institutions also anticipate court aid on 
                                                       
40. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 38, 
art. VI(4). 
41. Preliminary orders are generally akin to temporary restraining orders used in 
litigation in the United States. Note, however, that the UNCITRAL Model Law uses the term 
“preliminary orders” for interim measures that can be issued on an ex parte basis by the 
arbitral tribunal. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 20, art. 17 B. 
42. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 20, art. 17 J (establishing that the court has 
the same power of issuing interim measures in relation to arbitration proceedings as it has in 
relation to proceedings in court). 
43. See ÖSTERREICHISCHES SCHIEDSRECHT [AUSTRIAN ARBITRATION ACT] 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL I] No. 7/2006, as amended, § 585 (Austria), translated by 
Riegler/Fremuth-Wolf/Platte in STEFAN RIEGLER ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW OF AUSTRIA: 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 812-13 (2007) [hereinafter Austrian Arbitration Act]; Arbitration 
Act, 1996, c. 23, § 44 (Eng.) [hereinafter English Arbitration Act]; Zakon RF o 
Mezhdunarodnom Kommercheskom Arbitrazhe [Law of the Russian Federation on 
International Commercial Arbitration] ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] Aug. 14, 1993, 
amended by Federal’nyi Zakon No. 250-ФЗ, Dec. 3, 2008, art. 9 (Russ.); Arbitration Act, Act 
No. 1767, Mar. 16, 1966, amended by Act. No. 10207, Mar. 31, 2010, art. 10 (S. Kor.); 4 § 
LAG OM SKILJEFÖRFARANDE [ARBITRATION ACT] (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 
1999:116)] (Swed.), http://www.sccinstitute.com/media/37089/the-swedish-arbitration-act.pdf; 
Davies, supra note 33, at 326 (citing S.N.T.M. Hyproc. v. Snach, Cass. 2e Civ. June 8, 1995 
(Fr.), in 1996 REV. ARB. 125, 126) (holding by the Cour de Cassation that “the existence of an 
arbitration agreement is no obstacle to a judge granting ‘protective measures’ under the New 
Code of Civil Procedure”); see also Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, No. 26 of 1996, § 
9 (India). Note that the Supreme Court of India recently held that Indian courts can order 
interim relief under Section 9 or any other provision of the Arbitration Act only in support of 
arbitrations sitting in India. Bharat Aluminum Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum Technical Services 
Inc., Sept. 6, 2012. 
44. See CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] arts. 86-87 
(Braz.); KODIKAS POLITIKES DIKONOMIAS [KPOL.D.] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] VII:889 
(Greece), translated in ICCA INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 7 
(Jan Paulsson & Lise Bosman eds., Supp. 72 2007) (“The arbitrators may not order, amend, or 
revoke interim measures of protection.”); C.p.c. art. 818 (It.), translated in ICCA 
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 6 (Jan Paulsson & Lise Bosman 
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interim relief, generally providing that such help can be requested 
from the court prior to the constitution of an arbitral tribunal, and, in 
limited circumstances, even thereafter.45 
In the United States, the Federal Arbitration Act does not contain 
provisions expressly authorizing national courts to order interim relief 
in aid of arbitration.46 But US courts are generally perceived as 
willing to grant interim measures with respect to international 
arbitration when such measures support, rather than impede, the 
arbitral process.47 Prior to the constitution of an arbitral tribunal, the 
jurisdiction of a federal court to order interim measures may be based 
on its subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying dispute.48 Once 
the arbitration is commenced, the petition for interim relief could 
arguably be brought to the court independently of the underlying 
claim.49 In granting provisional remedies, the US federal courts will 
generally apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “FRCP”), 
such as Rule 65 for preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining 
orders.50 
However, US state law (as opposed to federal law) may also play 
a role, even in an international commercial case in federal court under 
the FAA. This is because provisional remedies available under Rule 
64 of the FRCP (e.g., arrest, attachment) are governed by the law of 
the state where the federal court is located.51 And so, even in the US 
District Court for the Southern District of New York—a federal 
court—New York state law will govern the issuance of attachment in 
                                                       
eds., Supp. 49 2012) (“The arbitrators may not grant attachments or other interim measures of 
protection. . . .”); Arbitration Act 2002 § 16 (Thai.), translated in ICCA INTERNATIONAL 
HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2 (Jan Paulsson & Lise Bosman eds., Supp. 37 
2003). 
45. See, e.g., AAA/ICDR Arbitration Rules, supra note 38, art. 24; Arbitration Rules of 
the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) art. 23 
(Jan. 1, 2015), http://cn.cietac.org/rules/rule_E.pdf [hereinafter CIETAC Arbitration Rules]; 
Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC), art. 26 (Apr. 1, 
2013), http://www.siac.org.sg/our-rules/rules/siac-rules-2013 [hereinafter SIAC Arbitration 
Rules]; Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
(SCC) art. 32 (Jan. 1, 2010), http://www.sccinstitute.com/media/40120/arbitrationrules_eng
_webbversion.pdf [hereinafter SCC Arbitration Rules]; ICC Rules of Arbitration, supra 
note 36, art. 28. 
46. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2015).  
47. See, e.g., 2 BORN, supra note 18, at 2540-41. For further analysis of the decisions of 
the U.S. federal courts, see Davies, supra note 33, at 303-12. 
48. See Davies, supra note 33, at 303. 
49. See id. at 311-12. 
50. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. 
51. Fed. R. Civ. P. 64. 
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aid of arbitration. Specifically, Section 7502(c) of the Civil Practice 
Law and Rules of New York provides courts with the power to order 
two types of provisional measures—a preliminary injunction and an 
order of attachment—with respect to a pending arbitration or an 
arbitration that is about to be commenced: 
inside or outside this state, whether or not it is subject to the 
United Nations convention on the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards, but only upon the ground that the award 
to which the applicant may be entitled may be rendered 
ineffectual without such provisional relief. 52 
A number of other states in the United States have adopted 
statutes, some of them based on the UNCITRAL Model Law,53 
granting their courts the power to order interim measures in support 
of arbitration.54 
Among the various courts available to the parties in international 
arbitration, it is the courts at the seat of arbitration that often have 
primary jurisdiction with respect to interim measures requests. This 
jurisdiction is typically concurrent with the arbitral tribunal once 
constituted, although the exact boundaries between the interim-
measures powers of court and tribunal remain unclear.55 Other 
national courts, such as those where the property in dispute or key 
evidence is located, or where enforcement can be expected, regularly 
get involved in providing interim relief56 or enforcing tribunal-
ordered interim measures. The role of these other courts may, 
however, be limited due to domestic law restrictions on assisting 
arbitral tribunals sitting beyond the jurisdiction of the court.57 
                                                       
52. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7502(c) (MCKINNEY 2005). The role of state law in interim relief 
applications has prompted us to conduct a supplemental search of border crossings in the 
Southern District of New York with reference to Section 7502(c), in addition to interim relief 
cases applying federal law. 
53. Most recently, such statute was adopted in Georgia in 2012. See GA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 9-9-20 to 9-9-59 (2012). 
54. See Davies, supra note 33, at 316-17; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.93 
(West 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 50a-109 (1989), 52-422 (1978); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7502(c) 
(MCKINNEY 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT § 1-567.39(c)(1) (2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 2712.14-2712.16 (West 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.470(3)(a) (1991); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & 
REM. CODE ANN. § 172.175(c) (West 1997). 
55. See, e.g., Charles Price, Conflict with State Courts, in INTERIM MEASURES IN 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 39, 40 (Ass’n for Int’l Arbitration eds., 2007). 
56. See Davies, supra note 33, at 300-03. 
57. One of the concerns that have been raised in this respect is whether the country’s 
commitment to international arbitration should go as far as providing assistance to foreign 
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Moreover, under some national laws, courts’ power to order interim 
measures and whether such power is exclusive to the courts or shared 
with an arbitral tribunal depends on the type of interim relief sought.58 
C. Court appointment of arbitrators and related measures 
A separate category of border crossings relates to the 
appointment of arbitrators by the court. Domestic arbitration laws 
commonly permit the parties to agree on any procedure for the 
appointment of arbitrators. They also typically provide for a default 
procedure and an appointing authority—usually a court—to be relied 
upon if the parties cannot agree, or if the arbitrators fail to act in 
accordance with an agreed-upon selection procedure (such as where 
two party-appointed arbitrators cannot decide on a presiding arbitrator 
to constitute a three-person panel).59 Where there is a statutory role 
for courts in appointments, the relevant domestic laws commonly 
provide that the courts have the final say on the appointment of 
arbitrators and their decisions are not subject to appeal.60 In some 
countries, the national laws confer the functions of the default 
                                                       
arbitrations that might have no or minimum connections with the jurisdiction at stake, 
especially when it is not the jurisdiction of the seat. See id. at 301. 
58. For instance, under the laws of the People’s Republic of China, once the arbitral 
proceedings have begun, the courts appear to have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to 
requests for preservation of property and evidence. The application for such conservatory 
measures is made with an arbitral institution if one is used, which then forwards the request to 
the municipal court with jurisdiction over granting such measures. Consistent with these laws, 
the latest edition of the CIETAC Arbitration Rules provides in Article 23(1) that “[w]here a 
party applies for conservatory measures pursuant to the laws of the People’s Republic of 
China, CIETAC shall forward the party’s application to the competent court designated by that 
party in accordance with the law.” CIETAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 45, at art. 23(1) 
(emphasis added). However, Article 23(3) further provides that “[a]t the request of a party, the 
arbitral tribunal may decide to order or award any interim measure it deems necessary or 
proper in accordance with the applicable law or the agreement of the parties. . . .” Id. 
(emphasis added). Thus, the CIETAC Arbitration Rules permit tribunal-ordered interim 
measures. Yet, it is unclear how such measures are distinct from conservatory measures under 
Article 23(1), which can be ordered only by the courts. Arguably, beyond the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the courts with respect to measures on property and evidence preservation, the 
tribunals can order other interim measures, especially where such measures are not governed 
by the laws of the People’s Republic of China and will be enforced outside of China. 
59. See, e.g., English Arbitration Act, supra note 43, §§ 16-18; NOUVEAU CODE DE 
PROCÉDURE CIVILE [N.C.P.C.] art. 1452 (Fr.); Arbitration Law, Royal Decree No. M/34, 
art. 15 (Apr. 16, 2012) (Saudi Arabia); BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DAS INTERNATIONALE 
PRIVATRECHT [IPRG] [FEDERAL STATUTE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW] Dec. 18, 1987, 
SR 291, art. 179 (1988) (Switz.); see also UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 20, art. 11. 
60. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 20, art. 11(5). 
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appointing authority on an arbitral institution, not a national court.61 
This is the rarer scenario. 
In practice, when a party resists arbitration, a request for the 
appointment of an arbitrator often accompanies a request to compel 
arbitration. In the United States, in addition to its powers to compel 
arbitration under 9 U.S.C. §206, a US district court having 
jurisdiction under Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, has the 
power to appoint arbitrators in accordance with the provisions of an 
applicable arbitration agreement.62 
D. Court deciding on a challenge to an arbitrator 
National arbitration laws also generally provide for border 
crossings into national courts for challenges to arbitrators.63 In 
jurisdictions adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law, the rules on 
challenges are outlined in Article 13, which allows the parties to agree 
on a procedure for challenging an arbitrator. It also provides that, 
failing such agreement, a challenge can be made, first, before the 
arbitral tribunal in accordance with Article 13(2). If, however, the 
challenge under the procedure as agreed by the parties or provided for 
in Article 13(2) is unsuccessful, Article 13(3) permits the challenging 
party to request a court to decide on the challenge within thirty days.64 
Article 13(3) determinations are not subject to appeal. While the court 
proceedings on the challenge are pending, Article 13 permits the 
arbitral tribunal, including the challenged arbitrator, to continue the 
arbitral proceedings, even to the point of rendering an award.65 
The availability of, and grounds for, a request for court review of 
an arbitral tribunal’s adjudication of a challenge to an arbitrator varies 
across jurisdictions. For instance, in England and Germany, judicial 
review of challenges is considered mandatory and cannot be limited 
by contract between the parties.66 By contrast, court review is more 
limited in France, Switzerland, and Singapore. Courts in those 
                                                       
61. See, e.g., Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by Order 
No. 31 of the President of the People’s Republic of China, Aug. 31, 1994) art. 32; Law of the 
Russian Federation on International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 43, art. 11. 
62. 9 U.S.C. § 206. 
63. See, e.g., English Arbitration Act, supra note 43, § 24; FEDERAL STATUTE ON 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 61, art. 180(3). 
64. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 20, art. 13(3). 
65. Id. 
66. See, e.g., JEFFREY WAINCYMER, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 324 n.418 (2012). 
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countries typically refuse to review arbitral panel denials of 
challenges or permit them only in limited circumstances, such as 
when a challenge is based on recently discovered information.67 
The challenge of an arbitrator can also be made in setting aside 
proceedings before a court after an award is rendered. A party might 
move to vacate an award on the ground that the composition of the 
arbitral tribunal was not in accordance with the arbitral agreement.68 
This becomes the only option available for parties where a national 
arbitration law, like the US Federal Arbitration Act,69 does not accord 
an explicit right for courts to address challenges until a final award is 
rendered. 
A related issue is the request for disqualification of an attorney 
or a law firm from representing a party in international arbitration. 
Such requests would normally be addressed to the courts. In New 
York, in the context of ongoing arbitral proceedings, the courts (and 
not the arbitral tribunals) have exclusive jurisdiction to address 
attorney disqualification requests based on conflicts of interest and 
professional responsibility violations.70 Although, for the purposes of 
this study, we will categorize them together with arbitrator 
challenges, in theory, this resort to national courts could constitute an 
independent border crossing in its own right. 
E. Court deciding on the termination of the arbitrator’s mandate 
An additional border crossing is permitted pursuant to Article 14 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which regulates failure or 
impossibility to act by an arbitrator. Specifically, if an arbitrator 
becomes de jure or de facto unable to perform or for other reasons 
fails to act without undue delay, the arbitrator’s mandate terminates if 
the arbitrator withdraws or if the parties agree on the termination.71 If 
there is any controversy over whether arbitrators have failed to act, 
under Article 14(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, any party may 
                                                       
67. Id. at 324 n.419. 
68. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 20, art. 34(2)(a)(iv). 
69. See, e.g., WAINCYMER, supra note 68, at 324. For the right of the U.S. court to 
remove arbitrators before the final award is made, see generally Yulia Andreeva, How 
Challenging is the Challenge, or Can U.S. Courts Remove Arbitrators Before an Arbitration 
Has Come to an End?, 19 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 127 (2008). 
70. See, e.g., Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Insco, Ltd., 2011 WL 4552997 (S.D.N.Y 2011); In Re 
Arbitration Between R3 Aerospace, Inc. & Marshall of Cambridge Aerospace Ltd., 927 F. 
Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
71. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 20, art. 14. 
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request a court to decide on the termination of the arbitrator’s 
mandate. A resultant decision of the court is not subject to appeal.72 
National arbitration laws may also provide for court involvement 
with respect to the arbitrator’s right to resign. For instance, in cases of 
failure or impossibility to act, Article 14 of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law allows an arbitrator to resign without establishing further 
conditions for resignation. By contrast, the Belgian Judicial Code 
provides that an arbitrator cannot resign without prior judicial 
approval.73 Similarly, the Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure 
requires approval of the parties, a designated appointed authority, or a 
court.74 The US Federal Arbitration Act does not have an analogue to 
UNCITRAL Model Law Article 14(1), and so there are no separate 
data recorded for this border crossing in our study. However, the 
assistance of a US court might be invoked under 9 U.S.C. §206, by 
framing the issue as one in which arbitrators are not acting in 
accordance with the relevant arbitration agreement. 
F. Court deciding on the matter of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction 
As discussed above, arbitrators, as adjudicators, are understood 
to have jurisdiction to determine the scope of their own jurisdiction—
a fundamental principle of judicial independence. In international 
arbitration circles, this is known as the principle of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz. But in light of the possibility that arbitrators will be self-
serving in upholding their jurisdiction (particularly since they have an 
economic incentive to do so), all national laws envision resorting to 
national courts for judicial review of arbitral panel jurisdictional 
decisions, especially those to affirm. For instance, Article 16(3) of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law allows any party, within thirty days of 
having received the notice of an arbitral tribunal’s preliminary award 
upholding its own jurisdiction, to request a court to review the 
holding.75 Judicial review thus serves as a sort of interlocutory appeal 
on the threshold question of arbitral jurisdiction. Article 16(3) further 
provides that any decision of the court is not subject to appeal; while 
the decision of the court is pending, the arbitral tribunal is authorized 
                                                       
72. Id. 
73. See, e.g., WAINCYMER, supra note 68, at 328 n.447 (referring to CODE JUDICIAIRE 
[C.JUD] art. 1689 (Belg.)). 
74. See id. (referring to RV art. 1029(3)-(4) (Neth.)). 
75. UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 20, art. 16(3). 
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to continue the arbitral proceedings.76 A similar right to review an 
arbitral tribunal’s threshold jurisdictional determination is part of the 
domestic laws of many countries, including such leading arbitral 
jurisdictions as France, Germany, and Switzerland.77 
Obviously, the greater risk in an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdictional 
holding is that it will find jurisdiction where it should not, i.e., that the 
panel will find a dispute arbitrable. Thus, German law only provides 
for judicial review of a tribunal’s affirmation of jurisdiction.78 In most 
jurisdictions, however, the relevant national laws provide for judicial 
review of all arbitral jurisdictional holdings, regardless of whether the 
tribunal affirms or denies jurisdiction.79 In practice, there are very few 
instances where an arbitral panel refuses to find jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, these national laws are more about aesthetic symmetry 
rather than practical effect, as the more precisely calibrated German 
law implicitly acknowledges. 
National laws also set out varying standards of review to be 
applied by courts in checking arbitral decisions on jurisdiction.80 
Some countries treat the arbitrators’ decision as provisional and 
authorize de novo review by courts.81 Other countries defer to the 
tribunal’s determination with respect to its own jurisdiction and apply 
an unreasonableness or manifest-error standard of review.82 
Finally, the laws of some countries permit the parties to enter 
into arbitration agreements that explicitly cut off judicial review of 
the arbitral tribunal’s holding on its own jurisdiction.83 Such 
                                                       
76. Id. 
77. See NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [N.C.P.C] art. 1502 (Fr.); 
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], promulgated Dec. 5, 2005, 
BGBL. I at 3202, last amended by Gesetz [G], Oct. 10, 2013, BGBL. I at 3786, § 1040(3) 
(Ger.); FEDERAL STATUTE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 61, art. 190(2)(b). 
78. See, e.g., 1 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1101 
n.294 (2d ed. 2014) [hereinafter 1 BORN] (citing Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of 
Justice] June 6, 2002, SCHIEDSVZ 39, 2003 (Ger.)). 
79. See id. (referring to decisions providing for judicial review of negative jurisdictional 
awards in Belgium, England, France, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States). 
80. See Frédéric Bachand, Court Intervention in International Arbitration: The Case for 
Compulsory Judicial Internationalism, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 83, 94 (2012). 
81. See, e.g., 1 BORN, supra note 78, at 1107-10. 
82. See, e.g., Bachand, supra note 82, at 94-95 (citing Ace Bermuda Ins. Ltd. v. Allianz 
Ins. Co. of Canada, 2005 ABQB 975 (Can.) (where the Court of the Queen’s Bench of Alberta 
held that the standard of review relied upon was “one of reasonableness and deference”)). 
83. For instance, agreements to enhance competence-competence, that is to agree to 
finally resolve jurisdictional issues by arbitration, are permitted under the English law. See, 
e.g., 1 BORN, supra note 78, at 1097. By contrast, the law of Germany does not allow the 
parties to exclude the competence of the German courts with respect to tribunal’s jurisdiction. 
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agreements however are rare, even in the countries that allow them. 
Absent such an agreement, judicial resolution of arbitral tribunal 
jurisdictional holdings is available in most countries. Generally, 
national laws allow the arbitral panel to continue its proceedings even 
to the point of issuing an award while judicial review of the panel’s 
jurisdiction is pending.84 In any event, if a party did not contest 
jurisdiction at the outset, it can still make the challenge in a 
proceeding to set aside or refuse enforcement of an arbitral award 
after it has been rendered. 
G. Court enforcement of tribunal-ordered interim measures 
Part I.B above focused on court-ordered interim measures in aid 
of arbitration; here we discuss court enforcement of interim measures 
ordered directly by an arbitral tribunal. A strong recent movement in 
national arbitration laws85 and institutional arbitration rules86 is the 
tendency to give international arbitral tribunals the power to order 
interim relief.87 These include measures: (1) seeking to preserve the 
subject-matter of the dispute; (2) assisting the arbitral proceeding 
(ordering discovery or preservation or production of evidence); and 
(3) securing the effective execution of the award. The arbitration laws 
and rules generally provide a party opposing interim measures the 
                                                       
Thus, the German courts can always review jurisdictional determinations made by arbitral 
tribunals. See id. at 1121-25. 
84. See id. 
85. See, e.g., Federal Arbitration Act, supra note 46; Austrian Arbitration Act § 593, in 
RIEGLER ET AL., supra note 43, at 812-13; Arbitration Law, Law No. 138 of 2003, art. 24 
(Japan); Law of the Russian Federation on International Commercial Arbitration, supra 
note 43, art. 17. 
86. See, e.g., AAA/ICDR Arbitration Rules, supra note 38, art. 24(1); Deutsche 
Institution für Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit e.V. [DIS] [Arbitration Rules of the German Institution 
of Arbitration], § 20.1 (July 1, 1998), http://www.dis-arb.de/en/16/rules/dis-arbitration-rules-
98-id10; ICC Rules of Arbitration, supra note 36, art. 28(1); London Court of International 
Arbitration (LCIA) Arbitration Rules art. 25.1 (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_
Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-2014.aspx [hereinafter LCIA Arbitration Rules]; 
Rules of Arbitration of the Vienna International Arbitral Centre (VIAC) art. 33(1) (July 1, 
2013), http://www.viac.eu/en/arbitration/arbitration-rules-vienna/93-schiedsverfahren/wiener-
regeln/144-new-vienna-rules-2013; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 34, art. 26(1). 
87. For further review of arbitration rules providing arbitral tribunals with the power to 
order interim measures and the role of the court with regard to interim measures, see, for 
example, Christopher Boog, Interim Measures—Relevance of the Courts at the Place of 
Arbitration and Other Places, in FORUM SHOPPING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION CONTEXT 199 (Franco Ferrari ed., 2013); see also 2 BORN, supra note 18, at 
2428-2511. 
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opportunity to object,88 but may also allow for ex parte requests in 
emergencies.89 The latter are particularly controversial, as they seem 
incompatible with the consensual nature of arbitration.90 Nevertheless, 
the UNCITRAL Model Law now authorizes ex parte applications for 
“preliminary orders” that are binding on the parties and do not require 
going to a court for enforcement.91 Such preliminary orders are 
limited to 20 days and will expire thereafter unless the tribunal 
extends the time period after the encumbered party has had an 
opportunity to interpose its objections.92 
Some national laws have no special provisions on arbitral 
tribunals’ power to order interim measures;93 others provide detailed 
rules on the tribunals’ power and courts’ role in enforcing any 
tribunal-ordered interim measures.94 Such court enforcement of 
tribunal-ordered interim measures may lead to additional border 
crossings and may require modification of the measures by the court 
                                                       
88. See, e.g., LCIA Arbitration Rules, supra note 88, art. 25.1 (“The Arbitral Tribunal 
shall have the power [to order interim and conservatory measures] upon the application of any 
party, after giving all other parties a reasonable opportunity to respond to such application.”); 
see also Austrian Arbitration Act § 593(1), in RIEGLER ET AL., supra note 43, at 812 
(providing for on notice application for interim measures “[u]nless otherwise agreed by the 
parties, the arbitral tribunal may, upon request of a party and after hearing the other party, 
order such interim or protective measure it deems necessary . . .”). 
89. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 20, arts. 17 B-17 C (discussing 
conditions of granting preliminary orders, which may be requested by the moving party 
without notice to any other party). 
90. See, e.g., Hans van Houtte, Ten Reasons Against a Proposal for Ex Parte Interim 
Measures of Protection in Arbitration, 20 ARB. INT’L 85 (2004); see also United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law, Report of the Working Group on Arbitration and 
Conciliation on the Work of its Forty-Seventh Session (Vienna, Sept. 10-14, 2007), ¶ 53-60, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/641 (Sept. 25, 2007). Also note the results of the 2012 international 
arbitration survey conducted by the School of International Arbitration at Queen Mary 
University of London with the support of White & Case LLP, which are indicative of the 
divide on the desirability of ex parte applications, with 51% of respondents replying that they 
believe the arbitrators should have such power, while 43% of respondents stating that they 
should not (6% were unsure). See 2012 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: CURRENT 
AND PREFERRED PRACTICES IN THE ARBITRAL PROCESS (2012). 
91. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 20, art. 17 B. 
92. See id., art. 17 C. 
93. See id. 
94. See, e.g., Austrian Arbitration Act § 593(1), in RIEGLER ET AL., supra note 43, at 
812, which authorizes the arbitral tribunal to order interim or protective measures it “deems 
necessary in respect of the subject-matter in dispute if the enforcement of the claim were 
otherwise frustrated or significantly impeded, or there were a risk of irreparable harm.” The 
Act also provides for the procedure and standards of enforcement of such measures by the 
district courts in Austria, including the grounds for refusing enforcement by the court. Id. 
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prior to enforcement.95 Provisions on tribunal-ordered interim 
measures are also incorporated in the rules of international arbitral 
institutions, such as Article 28(1) of the ICC Rules of Arbitration, 
which gives the arbitral tribunal a broad power to “order any interim 
or conservatory measure it deems appropriate.”96 
In an effort to harmonize domestic arbitration laws concerning 
tribunal-ordered interim measures, the UNCITRAL Model Law 
introduced a new Chapter IV.A in 2006. The chapter also addressed 
the role of national courts in the enforcement of tribunal-issued 
interim measures.97 For instance, a party objecting to the enforcement 
of interim measures may assert any ground listed in 
Article 36(1)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), or (iv),98 which mirror the grounds for 
refusing enforcement of arbitral awards under Article V(1)(a)–(d) of 
the New York Convention. 
Emergency arbitration rules are a new frontier in international 
arbitration related interim measures.99 Such rules aim to serve the 
                                                       
95. One of the most specific rules in this respect is provided by Section 593(3) of the 
Austrian Arbitration Act: “Where the measure provides for a means of protection unknown to 
Austrian law, the court may, upon request and after hearing the other party, enforce such 
measure of protection under Austrian law which comes closest to the measure ordered by the 
arbitral tribunal. In this case the court may also, upon request, reformulate the measure ordered 
by the arbitral tribunal in order to safeguard the realization of its purpose.” See id. § 593(3). 
The Act further states that a court shall refuse enforcement of a measure if the “measure 
provides for a means of protection unknown to Austrian law and no appropriate means of 
protection as provided by Austrian law has been requested.” Id. § 593(4). 
96. See ICC Rules of Arbitration, supra note 36, art. 28; see also LCIA Arbitration 
Rules, supra note 88, art. 25.1(ii), which provides the arbitral tribunal with more limited power 
“to order the preservation, storage, sale or other disposal of any documents, goods, samples, 
property, site or thing under the control of any party and relating to the subject-matter of the 
arbitration.” 
97. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 20, at ch. IV A (Interim Measures and 
Preliminary Orders). Note that an interim measure is defined by the Model Law as “any 
temporary measure, whether in the form of an award or in another form, by which, at any time 
prior to the issuance of the award by which the dispute is finally decided, the arbitral tribunal 
orders a party to: 
(a) Maintain or restore the status quo pending determination of the dispute; 
(b) Take action that would prevent, or refrain from taking action that is likely to 
cause, current or imminent harm or prejudice to the arbitral process itself; 
(c) Provide a means of preserving assets out of which a subsequent award may be 
satisfied; or 
(d) Preserve evidence that may be relevant and material to the resolution of the 
dispute.” 
Id. art. 17. 
98. Id. art. 17 I. 
99. On emergency arbitration, see, e.g., AAA/ICDR Arbitration Rules, supra note 38, 
art. 6; ICC Rules of Arbitration, supra note 36, art. 29(1); SCC Arbitration Rules, supra 
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parties’ needs in cases where urgent relief is needed prior to the 
constitution of the arbitral tribunal. For instance, emergency 
arbitration rules have been introduced by the ICC (Article 29 of the 
ICC Rules of Arbitration, including the Emergency Arbitrator Rules 
found in Appendix V of the ICC Rules) and the AAA/ICDR 
(Article 6 of the ICDR International Dispute Resolution Procedures). 
These rules provide for the appointment of an emergency arbitrator at 
a very early phase of a dispute. Often, however, as with ordinary 
arbitral tribunals, the jurisdiction of an emergency arbitrator with 
respect to interim measures will be concurrent to the jurisdiction of 
national courts.100 Where no emergency arbitration is available under 
the controlling rules, or a party against whom an emergency interim 
measure is invoked refuses to comply with the emergency arbitrator’s 
order, court enforcement may be necessary.101 
To summarize, tribunal-ordered interim measures are of intense 
present interest in the international arbitration community. Provisional 
relief is a big part of litigation on the ground in national courts, 
particularly in the United States. Accordingly, because international 
commercial arbitration aspires to provide a relatively autonomous 
alternative to national court litigation, there has been a campaign to 
empower analogues to the type of interim measures that can be had in 
national courts. Nevertheless, the courts are not entirely written out of 
the equation and remain an important backstop to the enforcement of 
any interim measures that arbitral tribunals may issue, especially 
when a burdened party seeks to object or have them lifted. 
H. Court assistance in taking evidence 
Article 27 of the UNCITRAL Model Law authorizes an arbitral 
tribunal, or a party with the approval of the tribunal, to request 
                                                       
note 45, art. 32(4); SIAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 45, art. 26.2; see also Boog, supra 
note 89, at 203-04. 
100. See, e.g., ICC Rules of Arbitration, supra note 36, art. 29(7) (providing for a 
parallel jurisdiction of emergency arbitrator and national courts by stipulating that “[t]he 
Emergency Arbitrator Provisions are not intended to prevent any party from seeking urgent 
interim or conservatory measures from a competent judicial authority at any time prior to 
making an application for such measures, and in appropriate circumstances even thereafter, 
pursuant to the Rules”). 
101. See, e.g., AAA/ICDR Arbitration Rules, supra note 38, art. 6; ICC Rules of 
Arbitration, supra note 36, art. 29 (“Emergency Arbitrator”); SCC Arbitration Rules, supra 
note 45, App. II (“Emergency Arbitrator”). 
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assistance in taking evidence from a competent court.102 Specifically, 
courts can order the preservation or production of material evidence 
and documents or compel party witnesses to appear in arbitral 
proceedings. To be sure, the arbitral tribunal also has the power under 
domestic arbitration laws to summon party witnesses and request 
relevant documents.103 Generally, however, the arbitral tribunal has 
no coercive power to threaten or punish non-compliance and therefore 
must turn to a court.104 
Court assistance is also indispensable when a party wishes to 
rely on evidence or oral testimony from a non-party to the arbitration 
agreement. In the United States, discovery against non-parties might 
be obtained pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1782. This statute authorizes 
district courts to provide assistance to foreign and international 
tribunals by ordering non-parties to hand over relevant material 
evidence for use before them. The US courts are divided on whether 
the statute authorizes such assistance to private foreign or 
international arbitral tribunals, and whether a party must go to a 
tribunal first before making a request to a US court.105 Most countries 
do not have a statute like 28 U.S.C. §1782 that might arguably be 
construed to authorize a national court to order discovery from non-
parties for use in a private international arbitral proceeding. 
I. Setting aside of arbitral awards and related actions 
The making and delivery of an arbitral award to the parties does 
not mean that border crossing have come to an end. A common theme 
is that over ninety percent of arbitral awards are complied with 
voluntarily, and so courts need not get involved at all.106 But when a 
losing party believes that an award was erroneously rendered, it may 
move to vacate it in a national court. 
                                                       
102. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 20, art. 27. 
103. See, e.g., Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 7. 
104. See id. 
105. See, e.g., THE COMM. ON INT’L COM. DISPUTES, THE NEW YORK CITY BAR ASS’N; 
28 U.S.C. § 1782 AS A MEANS OF OBTAINING DISCOVERY IN AID OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION—APPLICABILITY AND BEST PRACTICES, http://www.nycbar.org/
pdf/report/1782_Report.pdf. 
106. This data have been supported by survey results. See, e.g., Loukas Mistelis & Crina 
Baltag, Special Section on the 2008 Survey on Corporate Attitudes towards Recognition and 
Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards: Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral 
Awards and Settlement in International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practices, 19 
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 319, 343 (2008). 
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An action to set aside or vacate an arbitral award usually takes 
place in a national court of the seat of arbitration, which would have 
primary jurisdiction. Parties sometimes seek to vacate an award in 
their home courts, especially if the relevant jurisdiction is the center 
of gravity of the dispute in question. The New York Convention 
mentions setting aside in Article V(1)(e), but does not specify the 
grounds on which an award might be set aside, thus leaving it up to 
domestic arbitration laws. Many such laws adhere to Article 34 of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, which adopts the grounds for refusing 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards under the New York 
Convention as the grounds for setting aside. 
In addition to provisions for setting aside or vacating an arbitral 
award in a national court (common to almost all states), some 
jurisdictions also provide for limited appeal to a court. For instance, 
Section 69 of the English Arbitration Act allows limited appeal on 
issues of law, and some national laws allow appeal of arbitral awards 
on both issue of law and fact (the Argentine Civil Cole, Article 758; 
the Iraqi Civil Code, Article 273-74).107 The US courts, on top of the 
statutory grounds in the Federal Arbitration Act,108 permit setting 
aside of arbitral awards that were rendered in “manifest disregard of 
law,”109 although the standard is exceedingly difficult to meet. Some 
countries adopt a “middle position”: their laws permit setting aside of 
arbitral awards when the arbitrators failed to apply the law the parties 
chose,110 thus allowing, in a sense, a meta-review of the merits. 
J. Recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards 
When a losing party refuses to satisfy an arbitral award, the 
winning party may ask a national court for an order to enforce the 
award. Recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards is perhaps the 
                                                       
107. See CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 646 (2012); 
see also Sapna Jhangiani & Nicola Vinovrški, Appeals of Issues of Foreign Law under the 
English Arbitration Act 1996—a Matter of Fact, 7 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 15 (2013). 
108. 9 U.S.C. § 10. 
109. See DUGAN, supra note 107, at 644 (referring to Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, 
W.L.L. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
110. See DUGAN, supra note 107, at 646 (citing Law of Arbitration in Civil and 
Commercial Disputes, Sultani Decree No. 47/97, art. 53(d) (July 1, 1997) (Oman) (permitting 
annulment of arbitral award “where the arbitrators have failed to apply the law chosen by the 
parties to govern their dispute”)). For a text of the Law, see Sultanati Decree No. 47/97 
Promulgating the Law of Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Disputes, in ICAA 
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Jan Paulsson & Lise Bosman 
eds., 1984 & Supp. 59 2010). 
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most commonly known and discussed category of border crossings—
it is the centerpiece of the New York Convention.111 The Convention 
requires signatory states to enforce foreign arbitral awards unless one 
of the grounds listed in Article V applies. For instance, under 
Article V(1)(e), recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may 
be refused if it has been set aside “by a competent authority of the 
country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.” 
However, the contracting States to the New York Convention are not 
obliged to refuse recognition of an award in this case; instead, 
recognition and enforcement may be refused. Consequently, the 
courts of some countries, such as France, will recognize an award that 
has been set aside in another country. 
One controversial issue specific to US federal courts is the 
dismissal of suits to enforce foreign arbitral awards on the ground of 
forum non conveniens—a common law doctrine under which cases 
which are more properly brought in other forums are dismissed. The 
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has consistently approved 
such dismissals, based not on Article V, but on its reading of 
Article III of the New York Convention. This Article states that 
signatory states “shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and 
enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the 
territory where the award is relied upon.”112 Forum non conveniens, 
according to the US courts, is such a “rule of procedure.”113 
Opponents of this view have argued that Article V provides the 
exclusive grounds for refusal to entertain a foreign award 
enforcement action, but to no avail. In our study, these cases are 
coded as award enforcement actions. 
Another way in which national courts get involved in the 
enforcement of international arbitration awards is when a winning 
party takes an arbitral award and obtains a judgment confirming it or 
refusing to set it aside.114 Judicial confirmation of international 
                                                       
111. Foreign arbitral awards may also be enforced under the provisions of regional 
treaties, such as the Panama Convention. See Panama Convention, supra note 39. 
112. New York Convention, supra note 2, art. III (emphasis added). 
113. See, e.g., Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311 
F.3d 488, 496 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The doctrine of forum non conviens, a procedural rule, may be 
applied in domestic arbitration cases brought under the provisions of the Federal Arbitration 
Act, . . . and it therefore may be applied under the provisions of the Convention.” (citation 
omitted)). 
114. See, e.g., Ocean Warehousing B.V. v. Baron Metals & Alloys, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 
245 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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arbitral awards is not required under the New York Convention; in 
fact, the abolition of the requirement for judicial confirmation was a 
major innovation over the Convention’s predecessor, the Geneva 
Convention of 1927115. However, there might be a shorter statute of 
limitations (the New York Convention does not specify a limitations 
statute) for foreign arbitral awards as compared to foreign 
judgments.116 Also, specific to New York, New York state courts will 
enforce a foreign judgment against a defendant without independently 
establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendant, while US 
national courts in New York, such as the SDNY, require personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant prior to enforcing an arbitral award 
against it. In both scenarios, an award creditor would be better served 
by a foreign judgment (i.e., because the creditor has more time to 
confirm a judgment than an award, or does not have to establish 
personal jurisdiction over the award debtor), and so seeks judicial 
confirmation, typically in a national court at the seat of arbitration. 
K. Execution of Enforced Arbitral Awards and Other Instances 
Even after an arbitral award is recognized by a national court, an 
award creditor might still require court assistance to execute on the 
assets of a recalcitrant award debtor, especially in arbitrations 
involving States and state entities which may assert sovereign 
immunity defenses. The most straightforward such case is when the 
award creditor seeks to attach the assets of the debtor in the 
jurisdiction to satisfy the award. Increasingly, however, a special 
issue has arisen in the post-judgment context because of the US 
federal courts’ liberal discovery rules. Award creditors come to the 
SDNY not only to enforce against assets in the jurisdiction, but also 
to obtain discovery regarding an award debtor’s assets outside of the 
United States. This sort of discovery is not available in any other 
country’s courts. As a result, the US national courts serve as a sort of 
clearinghouse for forensic accounting of the assets of the award 
                                                       
115. Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26, 1927, 92 
L.N.T.S. 301. 
116. See, e.g., Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffarhtsgesellschaft MBH & Co., 
Kommanditgesellschaft v. Navimpex Centrala Navala, 989 F.2d 572 (2d. Cir. 1993) (refusing 
enforcement of an ICC arbitral award as time barred). Cf Seetransport Wiking Trader 
Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MBH & Co., Kommanditgesellschaft v. Navimpex Centrala Navala, 29 
F.3d 79 (2d. Cir. 1994) (enforcing a French court judgment confirming the above ICC arbitral 
award at the seat of arbitration). 
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debtor. This trend is controversial from a policy perspective, since it 
involves the US courts in global discovery sometimes with little or no 
connection to the United States. 
*              *              * 
In summary, national court involvement in the international 
arbitration process is indispensable and diverse. Apart from the most 
common border crossings anchored in the New York Convention or 
national arbitration laws based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
additional instances of border crossings may derive from international 
treaties (such as the European Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration117), national laws, and rules of major arbitral 
institutions (ICC, LCIA, AAA/ICDR, SCC). 
II. BORDER CROSSINGS IN THE US DISTRICT COURT FOR   
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
New York is probably the most important city in the world for 
international commercial arbitration. The multilateral treaty that 
provides the basic architecture for the transnational enforcement of 
arbitration agreements and awards bears its name. Many parties, both 
foreign and domestic, choose to conduct arbitrations in New York, 
which is the headquarters of the American Arbitration Association’s 
International Centre for Dispute Resolution, and the location of a 
regional office of the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”). 
As a center of global finance and commerce, many businesses have 
bank accounts or assets in New York that make it a key enforcement 
jurisdiction. New York law is often chosen as the benchmark law in 
business contracts, even as between parties that are not US nationals 
and as to transactions that have no connection to the United States.118 
New York’s federal and state courts have a reputation for neutrality 
that make them attractive fora for litigation in support of arbitration. 
And, because many international arbitration cases that start in New 
York state courts are removed to US federal courts located in New 
York, those courts are a particularly valuable vantage point from 
which to collect data and test theories about border crossings. 
                                                       
117. For instance, while the New York Convention is silent on the provision of interim 
relief by courts in aid of international arbitration, such assistance by the courts are anticipated 
by the European Convention. See European Convention on International Commercial 
Arbitration, supra note 38, art. VI(4). 
118 See, e.g., Intern. Standard Elec. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima, 745 F. Supp. 172 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
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Surprisingly, no one has done so—a lacuna that this Article seeks to 
fill. 
The Article aimed to survey all litigation related to international 
arbitration that originated in the US District Court for the Southern 
District of New York (SDNY) after December 29, 1970, when the 
New York Convention entered into force in the United States. It is the 
first article in a planned series that will examine and analyze these 
data about international arbitration litigation in the SDNY. Future 
articles in the series will apply statistical treatments to the data and 
analyze the data to glean qualitative information on winners, losers, 
types of claims, and amounts of damages. 
In collecting and coding the data, we relied on both published 
and unpublished cases reported in the Westlaw database by 
employing the following methodology. First, we searched for all 
cases containing a reference to any provision of Chapter 2 of the 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)—the statute by which the New York 
Convention has been implemented in the United States. An advanced 
search for “9 usc 20*” & CO(SDNY) returned a list of 308 cases for a 
period from December 29, 1970 to September 15, 2014. 
Second, we performed a similar search for cases in the Southern 
District of New York that contain any reference to the provisions of 
Chapter 3 of the FAA, the provisions implementing the Inter-
American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (the 
“Panama Convention”), which entered into force for the United States 
on October 27, 1990. The advanced search for “9 usc 30*” & 
CO(SDNY) returned an additional list of 19 cases. To avoid 
duplications for cases found on both lists, we cross-referenced and 
deleted from the smaller Panama Convention list all cases already 
present on the New York Convention list. As a result, we crossed out 
10 duplicate cases and added the remaining 9 Panama Convention 
cases to the New York Convention list, yielding a total of 317 
observations from 1970 to the present day. 
Third, we performed an additional search to locate cases in the 
SDNY involving requests for court assistance in taking evidence in 
aid of international arbitration from third parties within the court’s 
jurisdiction—Category 8 in Table 1. Here, we searched for all cases 
in the Southern District of New York that contained the terms “28 usc 
1782”—the statute authorizing US federal courts to assist in the 
collection of evidence for foreign and international tribunals—and the 
terms “arbitration” or “arbitral” to limit the search results to cases in 
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which the relevant “foreign or international tribunal” was an arbitral 
panel. The advanced search for arbitra! & “28 usc 1782” & 
CO(SDNY) produced a list of 37 results, which were then analyzed 
for border crossings with respect to court assistance in taking 
evidence, with the earliest of such cases dating back to 1994. 
Fourth, we searched for cases where interim measures were 
ordered by the court in the SDNY under section 7502(c) of the Civil 
Practice Law and Rules of New York.119 Here, the advanced search 
for arbitra! & “7502(c)” & CO(SDNY) returned a list of 23 cases, 
which were then cross-referenced against cases already listed in the 
New York Convention list and then analyzed in search of additional 
instances of border crossings of Category 2—Court issuance of 
interim measures. 
Finally, we analyzed all cases on the lists by classifying 
identified border crossings into one of the 11 categories generated in 
Part I based on the New York Convention, the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, and recent high-profile litigation. As we proceeded with the 
analysis, occasional non-arbitration cases were crossed off the list. 
This would happen, for instance, when the New York Convention was 
mentioned in a case only in a footnote as an analogy without directly 
invoking its provisions. 
Cases were classified based on the original moving party’s 
motion or filing. For instance, if a moving party filed to vacate an 
arbitral award and the opposing party then cross-moved to confirm 
the same award, the case was counted as a single instance of a border 
crossing—in this example, Category 9 (Setting aside of arbitral 
awards). Similarly, if a party initially filed to confirm and enforce an 
arbitral award, and the opposing party moved to dismiss, the case was 
counted as a single instance of a Category 10 border crossing—
Recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. However, in a case 
where a party sued on a dispute despite the presence of an arbitration 
agreement, and the opposing party counter-moved to compel 
arbitration and stay court proceedings pending arbitration, we coded it 
as an action to enforce an arbitration agreement, a Category 1 border 
crossing. 
Generally speaking, a single case would normally be counted as 
a single border crossing. Occasionally, multiple border crossings for a 
                                                       
119. For reasons of such search for state law references in the U.S. district court practice, 
please see supra note 51 and the accompanying text, explaining the role of state law in 
provisional remedies granted by federal courts. 
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single case were recorded where a litigious party brought multiple 
actions or sought divergent forms of relief in the US federal district 
court within the context of a single case. For instance, if a motion to 
compel arbitration also contained a request to the court to appoint an 
arbitrator or to order an interim measure in aid of arbitration, such 
cases were counted as two instances of border crossings—categories 
1 and 3 (Enforcement of the arbitration agreement and Appointment 
of arbitrators) and categories 1 and 2 (Enforcement of the arbitration 
agreement and Court issuance of interim measures), accordingly. The 
results of our analysis are presented below (Table 2 and Table 3). 
 
Table 2. Border Crossings in SDNY, 12/29/1970-9/15/2014 
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1970 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
1971 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
1972 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
1973 - - - - - - - - - 2 - 2 
1974 - - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 
1975 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
1976 1 - - - - - - - - - - 1 
1977 3 2 - - - - - - - - - 5 
1978 1 1 - - - - - - - 2 - 4 
1979 2 - 1 - - - - - 1 1 - 5 
1980 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
1981 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
1982 - - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 
1983 1 1 - - - - - - - 1 - 3 
1984 2 1 1 - - - - - - - - 4 
1985 4 - 1 - - - - 1 - 1 - 7 
1986 1 1 - - - - - - - 3 1 6 
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1987 1 3 - - - - - 1 - 3 1 9 
1988 2 - 1 - - - - - - - - 3 
1989 1 1 - - - - - 1 1 2 - 6 
1990 - 1 - - - - - - - 1 - 2 
1991 3 - - - - - - - 1 1 - 5 
1992 6 - - - - - - - 3 1 - 10 
1993 3 - - 1 - - - - 1 2 - 7 
1994 5 1 1 - - - - 1 1 2 - 11 
1995 4 - 1 - - - 1 - - 2 - 8 
1996 5 - 1 1 - - - - 1 2 - 10 
1997 4 1 - - - - - 2 - 5 - 12 
1998 3 1 1 - - - - 1 - 2 1 9 
1999 3 2 - - - - - - - 3 - 8 
2000 4 - - - - - - - 1 1 1 7 
2001 2 2 - - - - - - - 5 1 10 
2002 2 2 - - - - 1 - 1 7 - 13 
2003 6 3 - - - - - - 1 8 1 19 
2004 2 - - - - - - - - 4 2 8 
2005 5 2 - - - - 1 1 - 3 - 12 
2006 - 1 - - - - - 1 1 2 2 7 
2007 2 - - - - - - - 4 4 - 10 
2008 3 2 - - - - - - 1 5 - 11 
2009 6 5 - - - - - - 1 9 - 21 
2010 6 8 - - - - - 2 2 9 2 29 
2011 5 - - - - - - 2 1 6 1 15 
2012 4 2 - - - - 1 1 1 8 1 18 
2013 7 3 1 - - - - - 1 7 1 20 
2014 2 - - - - - 1 - 1 6 - 10 
Total 111 46 9 2 - - 5 14 25 122 15 349 
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Table 3. Litigious Parties in SDNY, 12/29/1970-9/15/2014 
 
 Case name Border 
Crossings 
1. Thai-Lao Lignite (Thai) Co., Ltd. v. Gov’t of Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic120 
10, 11 
2. Amaprop Ltd. v. Indiabulls Fin. Servs. Ltd.121 1, 2, 10, 11 
3. Sanluis Dev., L.L.C. v. CCP Sanluis, L.L.C.122 9, 10 
4. Gerling Glob. Reinsurance Corp. v. Sompo Japan 
Ins. Co.123 
7, 11 
5. U.S. Titan, Inc. v. Guangzhou Zhen HUA Shipping 
Co., Ltd.124 
1, 1, 1 
6. Ermenegildo Zegna Corp. v. Lanificio Mario Zegna, 
S.p.A.125 
10, 11 
7. Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mutual Marine 
Offices, Inc.126 
2, 7, 9 
8. Pan Atl. Grp., Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co.127 7, 10 
9. Seetransport Wiking Trader Schifffarhtsgesellschaft 
MBH & Co., Kommanditgesellschaft v. Navimpex 
Centrala Navala128 
10, 11 
10. Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Intertanker Ltd. 
(consolidated, incl. Holborn Oil Trading Ltd. v. 
Interpetrol Bermuda Ltd.)129 
2, 8, 10, 11 
11. Jamaica Commodity Trading Co. Ltd. v. Connell130 1, 10 
12. Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Phoenix Greek Gen. Ins. Co.131 1, 2, 3 
Notes: 1 – Enforcement of the arbitration agreement; 2 – Court issuance of 
interim measures, 3 – Appointment of arbitrators; 4 – Challenges to 
                                                       
120. See 997 F.Supp.2d 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); 924 F.Supp.2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); 2011 
WL 3516154 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
121. See 2012 WL 4801452 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); 2010 WL 1050988 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
122. See 556 F.Supp.2d 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); 498 F.Supp.2d 699 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
123. See 348 F.Supp.2d 102 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); 2005 WL 3601904 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
124. See 2003 WL 23309445 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 182 F.R.D. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); 16 
F.Supp.2d 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
125. See 2003 WL 21709424 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 2002 WL 31427341 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
126. See 230 F.Supp.2d 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); 230 F.Supp.2d 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
127. See 878 F.Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); 1995 WL 38179 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
128. See 793 F.Supp. 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); 123 F.Supp.2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
129. See 718 F.Supp. 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); 658 F.Supp. 1205 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); 430 
F.Supp. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
130. See 1991 WL 123962 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); 766 F.Supp. 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); 1985 
WL 1423 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
131. See 1987 WL 28636 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); 1984 WL 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
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arbitrators; 5 – Termination of the arbitrator’s mandate; 6 – Challenges to 
arbitral jurisdiction; 7 – Enforcement of tribunal’s interim measures; 8 – 
Court assistance in taking evidence; 9 – Setting aside of arbitral awards; 10 – 
Recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards; 11 – Execution of enforced 
arbitral awards. 
III. ANALYZING THE DATA AND NORMATIVE PRESCRIPTIONS 
FOR BORDER CROSSINGS 
There are several conclusions to be drawn from the data. First, 
the two most highly trafficked border crossings are, as expected, the 
two that are the central focus of the New York Convention: actions to 
enforce arbitration agreements and actions to enforce or recognize 
arbitral awards. Between 1970 and 2014, there were 122 actions (35% 
of all border crossings observed) in the Southern District of New 
York involving suits to enforce arbitral awards, and 111 actions (32% 
of all border crossings) to enforce arbitration agreements (Table 2; 
Chart 1). 
 
Chart 1. Border Crossings in SDNY, 12/29/1970-9/15/2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Falling far behind, but ranking at numbers three and four in the 
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arbitral awards (7%). These data confirm natural expectations for the 
most trafficked border crossings and provide useful insight into 
frequency of crossings relative to each other (for trends over the 
years, see Chart 2 below). 
Still, the frequency of resort to interim measures and set-aside 
actions seemed to us unexpectedly low. With respect to interim 
measures, despite the considerable commentary in the international 
arbitration literature, and initiatives by major international arbitration 
associations to build in-house capacities, there did not appear to be as 
many suits relating to such measures as we had expected. Nor was 
there an appreciable increase in recent years: other than the eight 
observations in 2010 and five observations in 2009, the typical annual 
frequency count was one to three instances, and observations in that 
range were recorded as early as 1977 and 1978. Moreover, there does 
 
Chart 2. Four Most Trafficked Border Crossings in SDNY, 
12/29/1970-9/15/2014 
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Chart 2-continued from previous page 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
appear to have been a drop-off after 2010 as leading private arbitral 
institutions started implementing internal interim, provisional, or 
emergency measure granting capacity. With respect to the number of 
set-aside actions we expected more instances where a party initiated a 
lawsuit to vacate an arbitral award.132 The low frequency may be due 
to party expectations based on the law of the Second Circuit that the 
trial court will be highly unlikely to vacate an international arbitral 
award that falls under the New York or Panama Conventions. 
Those four border crossings dwarfed all others. The fifth-ranked 
border crossing comprised actions to aid in the execution of an 
arbitral award, of which we counted fifteen, all but two coming since 
                                                       
132. We coded cases where there was a cross-motion to vacate after an initial suit to 
confirm or enforce an arbitral award as recognition or enforcement actions, since that was how 
they started. 
0
2
4
6
8
10
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
20
14
Nu
m
be
r o
f b
or
de
r c
ro
ss
in
gs
Recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards
0
2
4
6
8
10
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
20
14
Nu
m
be
r o
f b
or
de
r c
ro
ss
in
gs
Enforcement of the arbitration agreement
2015] INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CASES, SDNY  349 
1998. And we only observed 14 instances where a party sought to get 
court assistance in taking evidence, including discovery from a third 
party under 28 U.S.C. §1782. The result is low but not surprising, 
given that the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit—the 
appellate court that includes SDNY—has interpreted the statute not to 
apply to international arbitral tribunals—a result that has been cast 
into some doubt by a subsequent US Supreme Court decision.133 
Moreover, as the protracted multi-country litigation between Chevron 
and Ecuador demonstrates, there can be multiple discovery requests 
by a party, not all of them filed in the same district.134 Thus, for any 
given parties, the actual number of border crossings for discovery 
under 28 U.S.C. §1782 could be higher than those observed in SDNY. 
We had also expected to see more suits involving requests to appoint 
arbitrators or challenging them that we actually observed—nine of the 
former and two of the latter. 
In terms of annual totals, it seems that there has been an upward 
trend in border crossings, at least since the 1970s and 1980s. 
However, the levels of international arbitration-related litigation have 
seemed fairly stable since 1992 or so, with a peak of 29 observations 
in 2010 (with the second highest of 21 observed in 2009). It may be 
too early to tell, but it seems that there has been a downward trend 
since 2010. One explanation for this peak might be the global 
economic crisis that possibly led to more disputes in arbitration and 
litigation. 
The statistics of arbitral institutions appears to reflect a similar 
tendency. The ICC, for instance, reported a greater than normal 
increase in requests for arbitration already in 2008 (663, as compared 
to 599 in 2007 and 593 in 2006), and an even higher increase for 2009 
– 817 requests for arbitration (the highest ever in the history of the 
ICC arbitration).135 On the back end of the arbitration process, the 
ICC then reported the highest number of awards rendered for the 
years 2011, 2012 and 2010 (508, 491, and 479, respectively).136 If one 
                                                       
133. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004). 
134. Over the years, Chevron and Ecuador filed multiple requests for discovery. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit calculated in 2011 that Chevron 
Corporation alone had submitted at least 25 motions for discovery under 28 U.S.C. §1782 in 
various courts in the U.S. See In re Chevron Corp., 650 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2011). 
135. For the ICC arbitration statistics, see the ICC International Court of Arbitration 
Bulletin and information presented on the ICC website at http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-
and-Services/Arbitration-and-ADR/Arbitration/Introduction-to-ICC-Arbitration/Statistics/. 
136. Id. 
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assumes that similar trends were present in other arbitral institutions 
and ad hoc arbitration,137 one would also expect higher number of 
border crossings for 2009 and 2010, as observed in the Southern 
District of New York. Also, we understood that we would not see any 
border crossings in Categories 5 and 6—courts deciding on the 
termination of the arbitrator’s mandate and reviewing a preliminary 
ruling by an arbitral tribunal upholding its own jurisdiction. Both are 
border crossings under the UNCITRAL Model Law which are not 
contained in the Federal Arbitration Act. 
Finally, we observed several persistent litigious border-crossers, 
although not so many as expected (see Table 3 above). One 
explanation for the low number of repeat border crossings may be that 
some additional crossings occur at the state court level or in other 
federal judicial districts and therefore are not observable in SDNY. 
More likely, the number of repeat crossers is small because an award 
debtor unhappy with the generative arbitration will probably not do 
anything and refuse to pay rather than hire lawyers to continue to 
challenge an arbitral award in costly court litigation. 
These conclusions, in turn, generate some policy 
recommendations and normative themes. First and at the most 
abstract level, the New York Convention seems to be working fairly 
well, notwithstanding occasional calls to amend it (e.g., to add 
provisions for enforcement of interim measures) or even to junk it 
altogether.138 Actions to enforce arbitration agreements and awards 
are still the main international arbitration events in national courts, 
and they far outnumber any other proceedings. In future work, we 
plan to engage in more detailed analysis of the facts of these cases to 
generate ideas about how national statutes might be revised or 
amended to make these high-traffic crossings more efficient. 
Second, there appear to be a few underutilized border crossings 
(e.g., those related to the appointment of arbitrators or challenges of 
arbitrators) that might be closed in national laws to make arbitration 
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more autonomous. In particular, the FAA, the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, and most major non-UNCITRAL statutes, provide for national 
court jurisdiction over arbitrator appointments and challenges. 
However, the data reveal that this is not a highly trafficked border 
crossing. With respect to appointments (there were only 9 
observations in the 45 years surveyed), perhaps more might be done 
to incorporate alternative appointment procedures into institutional 
rules. With respect to challenges, it seems to us prudent and better 
policy to keep this at the institution or tribunal level rather than leave 
room for resort to courts. And, to serve parties who choose ad hoc 
arbitrations, institutions should fine-tune “a la carte” rules that allow 
parties to invoke them solely for issues involving the appointment or 
challenge of arbitrators. 
Third, by contrast to the relative disuse and lack of need for 
resort to courts for appointment, challenge, and termination of 
arbitrators, courts do seem to be important in taking evidence or 
providing interim relief for arbitral proceedings. This state of affairs 
harkens back to the ancient partnership between the common law 
courts and courts of equity in early modern England and the United 
States. Common law courts handled substantive claims for money 
damages, but if a litigant there wanted supplemental provisional relief 
or discovery, he or she had to go to the equity court or chancery.139 It 
seems to us apt to envision a similar partnership between national 
courts and international arbitral tribunals, with the former in the role 
of chancery and the latter in the role of a common law court. 
Fourth, as Table 3 indicates, there appears to be a handful of 
persistent-objector litigious parties that attempt to get into national 
court as often as they can. Although abusive border crossings do not 
happen very often, there could—and should be—more attention paid 
to how national laws and institutional rules could be amended or 
designed to deter this sort of behavior. Of course, that is not to say 
that we would necessarily want to deter a party that is seeking to go 
into national courts because it believes in good faith that it never 
agreed to arbitration and is being railroaded. But we do want to deter 
a party that is just being stubborn when it did plausibly agree to 
arbitration. How can we solve this puzzle? One start to a solution 
would be to find a way to lock them into the national courts of one 
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jurisdiction—the primary jurisdiction, which would be designated by 
the parties or the place of arbitration. This could be done by 
inculcating a norm of designating a court of primary jurisdiction in 
arbitration agreement drafting. To reduce parallel proceedings in 
courts and arbitration, greater stays of proceedings under 9 U.S.C. §3 
could also be used. 
Fifth, disappointed parties in international arbitrations have not 
initiated suits to set aside or vacate arbitral awards in the Southern 
District’s trial courts as much as one would have expected—only 25 
times in 45 years. International arbitration scholars and practitioners 
as a group are reluctant to acknowledge a broad scope of national 
courts’ set-aside powers, especially in non-primary jurisdiction 
courts. As noted above, the reluctance flies in the face of the fact that 
a plain-language reading of words of the New York Convention 
suggests that set-aside jurisdiction is appropriate in any State “under 
the laws of which” an arbitral award was made. The data reveal that at 
least in the United States, even though in theory an award debtor 
could move first to set aside an award rendered in New York, it does 
not often do so. This in turn, suggests that concerns about recognizing 
multiple set-aside jurisdictions may be overblown. This is particularly 
true since the New York Convention does not require courts of 
signatory nations to deny recognition of an arbitral award on the 
ground that it was set aside by a foreign court—a discretion that the 
US courts of the Southern District have sometimes inadvertently 
forgotten. 
Finally, we predict that there will be a rise in resort to court for 
aid in execution of arbitral awards. For this category of border 
crossings, we observed a total of 15 instances, including three 
observations made between 1971 and 1999 and 12 – from 2000 to 
2014. Further growth of these border crossings will be assisted by the 
recent high-profile Argentina case decided by the US Supreme Court 
in June 2014.140 This trend leads us to the hypothesis that an award 
debtor does not react as much as expected when it loses an arbitral 
award. Consequently, it does not pay lawyers to try to set it aside. But 
the loser really minds when the award creditor begins the process of 
coercing it to pay. 
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CONCLUSION 
As the pace of global commerce quickens, the use of 
international arbitration to resolve commercial and investor-state 
disputes will accelerate correspondingly. But international arbitrations 
occur in the shadow of State-based international legal obligations 
(like the New York Convention) policed by national courts. Everyone 
knows this, but no one has explored what this partnership looks like 
on the ground by sifting the data. This Article is a first cut at filling 
this gap, using data from the Southern District of New York—the JFK 
airport of the international commercial arbitration world. The findings 
confirm some expectations and reflect doubt upon others. What is 
clear, however, is that national courts are heavily vested in aiding the 
international arbitral process, and there are ways to make them more 
effective in doing so. 
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